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Performativity and Sexual Identity in
Calderon's Las manos blancas no ofenden
(White Hands Don't Offend)
�ATTHEWD.STROUD

SPANISH COMEDIA BRIMS WITH EXAMPLES OF FLUID GENDER IDENTI

fication. Not only do women frequently dress as men, but other
characters almost always accept them as men or women depending
solely on the clothes they wear. Is gender so superficial in these
plays that it is merely a function of one's choosing the signifiers
one wants to wear? Or is there an essentialism to gender that forces
each character to assume the gender that corresponds to his or her
sex in order to have a happy ending? Or is it something else, per
haps more reflective of Judith Butler's investigations into the per
formative aspects of gender, in which gender is an inculcated func
tion of the symbolic Other, and is neither consciously chosen nor
casually acquired? Informed by phenomenology, psychoanalysis,
and feminism, Butler has constructed a thoroughgoing theory of
gender in which the materiality of the body does not take prece
dence over its meaning. The body is inscribed by culture and his
tory; it is a set of possibilities to be continually realized through
construction by corporeal acts. Sex is a biological fact, but gender
is cultural interpretation or signification, and gender is as gender
does. Gender as performative implies that there is no pre-existing
identity by which an act or attribute might be measured, no true or
false, real or distorted acts of gender. Even the notions of an essen
tial sex are part of the constructs to regulate and control gender
and to conceal its performative nature.
In addition to consideration of the ideas of Husser!, Merleau
Ponty, Foucault, and Wittig, Butler clearly and unapologetically
bases much of her work on gender on Lacan' s often cited but mas
sively misconstrued assertions regarding the relationship of sex
and gender to symbolic signification. Countering those who dis
miss Lacan' s separation of sex from gender as a whim one chooses
to adopt, Butler critically explores the nature of the symbolic, re-

109

110

PART 1: MEN REPRESENTING WOMEN

membering that it, too, is not-all, and that, while the working of
the symbolic is constant (at least in these theories), the particulars
of the symbolic manifestations of gender are not only wildly differ
ing from culture to culture, but also from time to time.Moreover,
Butler adds to our understanding of Lacan's symbolic structure of
gender by focusing on both the process of inculcation and iteration
required for the establishment of gender, and the important areas
of exclusion that are unsignified and unspoken, banished from
thought.t
An interesting play to study in light of Butler's ideas is Calde
ron's Las manos blancas no ofenden, a remarkable work that deals
with a man, Cesar, reared as a girl because his mother wanted him
to avoid the rigors of war (1087b), and a mujer varonil [cross
dressed woman], Lisarda, both of whom appear in clothes appro
priate both for their own and for the opposite sex.2 Does their gen
der reside in their behavior, in their clothes, or in their biological
sex? As frequently happens in the comedia, the gender questions in
Las manos blancas no ofenden are framed against the background of
love, both insistent, imaginary love and the symbolic obligations
and expectations that the culture requires of those in love. Cesar
and Lisarda cross-dress in an attempt to fulfill their demands, but
their motivations ar� different. Lisarda, abandoned by Federico
who has gone off to try to wed the princess Serafina, cross-dresses
in order to attend the competition for Serafina's hand and thereby
to exact her revenge against Federico. Like Rosaura in La vida es
sueflo, she adopts masculine dress in order to take care of her own
affairs. Cesar dresses in disguise to escape his mother's controlling
gaze and to win over Serafina, but he dresses and acts as a woman,
rather than a man, in accordance with his "feminine" upbringing.
In addition, according to Teodoro, Cesar's femininity might be
more successful with Serafina than masculine bravado:
... tu hermosura y tu gracia

(y mas si es que alguna vez,
donde ella lo escuche, cantas)
podra ser que Ia enamore
mas por las delicias blandas
que esotros por los estruendos. (1091a)
[your beauty and grace
(and what's more, if on some occasion
she happens to hear it, your singing)
it may be that you can enchant her
more with gentle charms
than all the others with their ostentatious show].
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In both cases, the new transvestite personas also have new
names, thus linking sexuality, or at least sexual categorization, and
identity. Lisarda invents for herself the name "Cesar," unaware at
the time that there is another character by that name whose path
she will cross. Lisarda's self-naming assumes self-determination,
but since all discourse is bounded by historicity, she cannot define
a new exclusive identity for herself as she wishes. When she dis
covers the existence of the real Cesar, she laments her misfortune
at having chosen, strictly coincidentally, the name of a person oth
ers are looking for (1105a-6a). In the symbolic, however, there are
always previous usages and prior significations that constrain the
attempt at autonomous meaning (Butler, Bodies 227-228), and her
inadvertent selection of the name "Cesar" demonstrates that all
names bring with them the history of their prior citations. When
Lisarda introduces herself as "Cesar," Cesar does not know what
to say (1996a); he ends up calling himself "Celia" (1097a).
Characters in disguise may wish that identity, both sexual and
social, were simply a symbolic function of clothing and names, but
recognition of identity (sexual and nonsexual) cannot be taken for
granted. Although Federico recognizes Lisarda dressed as a man,
Enrique, her own father, does not (1115b-1117b). Earlier, Serafina
thinks she recognizes Federico as the man who saved her from the
fire, but she is not sure (1099a). When Federico admits he saved
Serafina, Lisarda, who has the ring Serafina gave to Federico, is
able to convince Serafina that Federico was not the man who saved
her (llOOa-la). Naturally, Serafina believes the possession of the
ring more than Federico's words and accuses him of treason
(1101a). In other words, the ring becomes the sole determiner of his
identity just as Lisarda hoped she could really pass for "Cesar''
and Cesar for "Celia"; the signifier is (wrongly) believed to have
only one essential signified.
Curiously, while several (but not all) characters recognize Li
sarda even when she is dressed as a man, no one believes that
Cesar dressed as ��celia" is Cesar, or even a man (1117b). This dis
belief occurs even after he, as ��celia," is ironically forced to pre
tend that he is Cesar and he admits who he is (1123b). Adding to
the complication is the play within a play in which Serafina's ladies
want Cesar as "Celia" to play the role of the galtin (1098a). As prep
arations begin for the play, the stage is peopled by characters in
masks, as well as Lisarda and Nise, who are dressed as men but in
different outfits. When Cesar as "Celia" dons masculine clothing
for the play within a play, there is a different quality to the reaction
of others around him/her. Although no one seemed to notice that
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"Celia," who is a man dressed as a woman, was really a m h
named Cesar, no one takes "Celia" dressed as a galdn, that is, a
man dressed as a woman dressed as a man, to be a man. Thinking
that "Celia" has gone off the deep end in her overidentification
with the masculine galtin, Laura admonishes "her," "Mira, Celia,
que es locura I creer que lo que finges eres," (1123b) [Look, Celia,
it is madness/ to believe that you are what you pretend to be].
There is a difference between cross-dressing for theatrical pur
poses and cross-dressing in "real life." The difference lies both in
the contextual signification of the cross-dressing and in the differ
ence regarding control. Both Lisarda and Cesar choose their names
when they are in control of their cross-dressing, although they did
not choose their names or their genders at birth, and Cesar was not
able to choose his gender in the play within a play. It is allowed,
and even expected, in this case, that Celia should appear as a man.
This was not an unfamiliar circumstance in palace dramas of the
era and, because Serafina and the others know that "Celia" is to be
dressed as a man, in other words, that she fulfills their expecta
tions, they have no trouble identifying this masculine character as
"Celia." When Cesar comments on the novelesque qualities of his
situation, he points out that someone else writes one's identity,
one's gender, one's behavior, and the particulars defy the coherent
logic one would expect of a unified reality completely bounded by
symbolic restraints.
Cesar's simultaneous conjunction of and disjunction between
gender and anatomy bring up Butler's discussion of Lacan's ideas
on signification and sexuality.3 Material, whether sexual or of a dif
ferent nature, may exist in nature, but it cannot be apprehended
by the human subject without recourse to language, to discourse,
Lacan's symbolic register. Anatomy, like everything else, is subject
to signification and imaginary investments. Through the accep
tance of symbolic norms, of which "sex" is just one, the human
subject takes its place in society, becomes "viable." It is only by
submitting oneself to symbolic signification that one can become a
properly functioning subject. Discourse does not create sex, of
course, but language so structures human thought (and identity)
that one cannot think about sex without filtering the thought
through symbolic discourse.
The roles assigned to each sex are thus symbolically determined
by the division of signifiers into the discursive categories, "mascu
line" and "feminine," implying a humanistic essentialism that de
mands that gender, both the gender of self-identification and the
gender of the object of desire, flow naturally from anatomy (see
.

.

PERFORMATIVITY AND SEXUAL IDENTITY

113

Butler, Gender 10). By this way of thinking, one knows what behav
ior one can expect from other people based on their sexual catego
rizations. At one point, Cesar, dressed as a man for the play within
a play, wants to defend Serafina, but she refuses, noting that it is
not proper for a woman to do such things (1117b). But later, Sera
fina wants "Celia" to help her deceive Enrique (ironically by pre
tending to be Cesar), a more "feminine" activity (1122a). In addi
tion to their clothes and names, women are expected to be
essentially deceitful (Lisarda's disguise, her theft of the ring, her
lies to take revenge on Federico and to avoid being noticed by her
father), unskilled in war or honorable actions, in need of protection
(Enrique offers to hide Lisarda), objects of exchange (Serafina, who
has been chosen by the Holy Roman Emperor to inherit Ursino,
nevertheless needs a husband), fickle and unwilling to accommo
date masculine desire, as well as beautiful, with white hands and
good singing voices, associations that Cesar exploits in his activi
ties as "Celia" because of his sheltered childhood and his singing
talent (1097a). As a result of the role granted to him when he is
dressed as a woman, Cesar is much more able to manipulate events
regarding love through subterfuge than he could as a man. Most of
what he does is to win the favor of Serafina, although he does it
indirectly as a woman as opposed to directly as the other men in
the competition.
If women are conniving and powerful in their fluidity, men, in
addition to having appropriate names and clothes, are expected to
be protective of women, valiant (Federico saves Serafina from a
fire), cruel (Federico abandons Lisarda in search of a "better"
mate), competitive (men vie for Serafina's hand, 1095a), and pundo
noroso (Federico is prepared to fight Lisarda as "Cesar" over a per
ceived insult, 1116a). Even Federico cannot avenge the insult re
garding the glove since she is a woman, but he must do something
to preserve his own honor. Cesar, despite his "feminine" upbring
ing, is also prone to honorable action. When he is confronted with
Lisarda's cross-dressing for revenge, he feels that he has been dis
honored and grabs his sword (1123b). Enrique and Lisarda point
out the contradictions of the masculine position. Enrique still
wants to kill his daughter, but Federico, now engaged to Lisarda,
protects her, and even Enrique himself, probably because he does
not recognize Lisarda, offers her his protection: he will hide her in
his room and tell the others that she has left (meaning that, ironi
cally enough, Lisarda will hide in Enrique's room to hide, at least
in part, from Enrique; 1118b-19a).
That sexuality may be a function of signification has contradic-
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tory consequences. On the one hand, gender identity is seen to be
no more than an accretion of superficial signifiers: Lisarda is a man
if she dresses as a man. On the other hand, if one bears masculine
signifiers, one can therefore be further defined by a whole host of
expected behaviors that cohere with that label. Of course, signifi
cation, in sexuality as in everything else, based as it is on presence
and absence, is a function of lack. Sexual materiality (or material
sexuality) cannot be used reliably as a constant on which significa
tion is based. The referent is never the same as the signified; there
is always an element of imaginary meconnaissance [misapprehen
sion) on· the one hand and the unsymbolizable real on the other
(Butler, Bodies 68-69, 191-192). Signification also captions other
ness, for the signifiers themselves are not original with each sub
ject, but are borrowed from (or imposed by) the symbolic register.
For the subject, signification captions the structuring lack that cre
ates desire and makes the human subject human. In the arenas of
sexuality and identity, the signifiers that denote what one is (or
what one wants to appear to be), always imply what one is not.
Finally, the signification that is thought to spring naturally from
the body actually creates the discursiv� context in which the body
functions. Butler states that the "signifying act delimits and con
tours the body that it then claims to find prior to any and all signi
fication" (Bodies 30). Just as there is no metalanguage, there is no
metasignification. When the signifiers begin to shift, as in the case
of cross-dressing, the important division between self and other
starts to break down.
The submission to the symbolic that marks the construction of
an identity, an "I" (however that may be defined), is also at work
in gender. All symbolic distinctions are ultimately discursive, and
even fictional. Neither names, gender, nor the pronoun "I" have
any essential content or absolute meaning (Butler, Bodies 209). But
neither is gender a casual choice, as easily changed as these charac
ters change their clothes. Rather, gender is a repeated inscription
"forced by symbolic repression on the unconscious level" (Butler,
Bodies 12; "Performative" 276). One learns one's gender, and the
roles attached to it, in much the same way one learns one's name:
by repetition. The symbolic law does not merely prescribe or dic
tate a gender, much as it may try to; sex and gender maintain a
dynamic interaction with the law, which is produced and upheld
through its "citation" that establishes its authority by standing on
the prior decisions infinitely extending into an unrecoverable past
(Butler, Bodies 14, 108, 131, 225-26). In other words, the norms that
are invoked regarding masculine and feminine behavior do not

PERFORMATIVITY AND SEXUAL IDENTITY

115

precede that behavior but are, in fact, instituted by the behavior.
Thus, there can be no essential gender, despite anatomical reality,
because "gender is constituted by the performance itself" (Butler,
"Performative" 278). Sex is not nothing, of course. It is a mark to
be symbolized, to be regularized by symbolic signification, a pro
cess that retroactively attributes to the body a certain sexual posi
tion.• Moreover, the body is subject to both symbolic signification
and imaginary fantasy. As Lacan noted, the morphology of the
body is a psychically invested projection; bodies are only "whole"
in the imaginary (Butler, Bodies 72-73), and organs and other body
parts, inasmuch as they are considered to establish gender, always
become imaginary effects (Butler, Bodies 72-73, 77). While others
believe that gender is a simple construct, Butler sees performativity
as a way out of this constructed/determined dichotomy (Bodies 94).
Socialization "requires a performance which is repeated" ("Per
formative" 277); ontology is "constituted by forms" (Bodies 99),
forms that are insistently repeated.
In Bodies That Matter, Butler explains in detail her notion that
gender assignment is a forcible, reiterative practice, but it is not en
tirely successful or completely determining (231). The process of
reiteration, so necessary to symbolic acculturation regarding both
discourse and sexuality, underscores the submission of the subject
to Other norms and one's entry into "society;" the image of the
body, whatever that image is, comes at a price, that is, it "is pur
chased through a certain loss" (75). Reiteration also points out the
lack of totalizability of the Other. If the symbolic process were com
pletely effective, it would take place the first time; no repetition of
the lesson would be necessary (2). The fact that one must con
stantly repeat the same lesson discovers the lack not only at the
center of the subject but also at the core of the Other, the fact that
there is no Other of the Other (Lacan, Ecrits 311, 316). Then again,
instabilities arise in the repetition of the symbolic code from one
iteration to the next (10). It is this ironic relationship between cause
and effect that Butler defines as performativity. A performative
"acts in some way to constitute that which it enunciates" (217).
However, a performative success "is always and only provisional"
(226). Gender, because it is performative, can never be completely
internalized, completely absorbed into one's being as one's own
(Gender 141). There is an intensified suspension of disbelief in all
these actions, including (maybe especially) those involving gender.
Gender, thus, is "a regularized and constrained repetition of
norms.... , a ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and
through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and
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taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death" (Butler, Bodies
95; see also Gender 140-141). It is the coming together of material
ity, discourse, and power exerted by others and by the symbolic
Other.
The trope that best represents the gender fluidity in this play is
catachresis, or the forced use of an inappropriate or paradoxical
word such as the name "Celia" applied to a man and "Cesar" ap
plied to a woman. In the theater, one can extend the definition of
catachresis to the application of inappropriate visual signifiers
such as clothes.In its attempt at normalization, society tries to out
law catachresis.The inappropriate signifier, especially in a gender
sense, brings up the possibility of violation of the gender constric
tions. Carlos is shocked that "Celia" should appear in masculine
dress after the play within a play: "LQue hace Celia en este traje I
delante de tanta gente?" (1124b) [What is Celia doing in this outfit/
in front of so many people?], and he subsequently speaks of Ces
ar's disguise in terms of treason and offense (1125b). But the inap
propriateness is an effect of the law itself.Without the arbitrary law
saying, for example, that men must not have women's names, there
would be no catachresis.For Butler, then, catachresis is "a perpet
ual risk that rigid designation seeks to overcome, but always also
inadvertently produces ..." (Butler, Bodies 214).
So the body is defined by and represented in language, all
speech is phallic, and the symbolic is androcentric (Butler, Bodies
60; Lacan, Seminar II, 261). Butler would add that the symbolic is
also heterocentric or heterosexist.She discusses at length the "het
erosexual matrix" of symbolic repression and the effect of enforced
heterosexuality on the conceptualizations of sex (Butler, Bodies 3,
15, 63, 73, 97; Gender 19), all of which are manifestations of sym
bolic regulatory power.At the same time, there is law, the symbolic
laws of discourse, that one must obey if one is to be able to think
symbolically and thereby be admitted into symbolic society. The
symbolic law everywhere insists on the heterosexual norm, which
is accompanied by all manner of approbation for "correct" behav
ior and all manner of punishment and cruelty for transgression.
From "It's a girl!" to "I pronounce you husband and wife," the
symbolic insists upon the subject's inscription into the externally
designated heterosexual role.5 But such intense insistence suggests
that heterosexuality is not as stable, not as normative, not as "natu
ral" or satisfying, as those who wish to regulate sexuality would
like (Butler, Bodies 125-126; Gender 140). Sex, sexuality, and gender,
and the distinctions that one makes among the terms, are manifes
tations of symbolic regulatory power, but materiality, including
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sexual materiality, is a function not of adherence to symbolic
norms but of violation (Butler, Bodies 29). Once again, the symbolic
fails to deliver on its promises. The symbolic system will always
demand more than the subject has to give, desire always insists,
and subjects do not necessarily accept the roles that the symbolic
has in mind for them. One can, according to Monique Wittig,
choose to "become neither female nor male, woman nor man"
(cited in Butler, Gender 113).
In the comedia, the symbolic culture attempts to restrain the free
flow of gender signification by the insistence on heterosexual mar
riage. The repetition of the marriage scenario in comedia after come
dia is one manifestation of this cultural insistence upon the inculca
tion of heterosexuality, and this imperative tries to convince us of
the essential nature of heterosexuality as determined by anatomy.
This play ends with three marriages, all of which are rather super
ficially (and heterosexually) imposed. The ending occurs rapidly
and according not to the wishes of the characters involved, but to
symbolic norms. Serafina marries Cesar because they are both
princes, despite his "femininity." The effeminate man, regardless
of his inclinations, is still anatomically male and must be a hus
band to a wife. Only by submitting to the symbolic order can Cesar
continue to be part of the society, as others who have resisted sub
mission, such as Gila in Velez's La serrana de la Vera [The Country
Girl from La Vera], prove by their effective expulsions, usually
leading to tragedy. Federico marries Lisarda, despite her decep
tions and his abandonment, because there was a promise, a sym
bolic contract, at the beginning of the play. Patac6n and Nise
marry, as far as we can tell, only because they are a man and a
woman, and, ipso facto, should be married:
Patac6n. lQue haremos, Nise, nosotros?
Nise.
Casarnos adredemente,
porque sepa que podemos
cualquiera de los oyentes. (1126b)
[Patac6n. What shall we do, Nise?
Nise.
Get married quickly,
so that everyone
will know that we can].

Any provocative gender subversion is erased by the symbolic. It
is, perhaps, the comedia's very insistence on the symbolic heterosex
ual pact, even when dealing with the most extravagant characters,
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that calls attention to the binary system in which all members of
society are categorized according to their sex.
The comedia in general, and this play in particular, seem to vacil
late between assumptions of gender and identity fluidity and a het
erosexual essentialism that forces characters ultimately to live ac
cording to their predetermined roles. As with many other
instances of ambivalence, the comedia exploits the uncertainty for
theatrical benefit, while at the same time commenting, directly and
indirectly, on the issue at hand. It is quite possible that Calderon
ended the play as he did because he believed, along with the moral
arbiters of his day, that males and females had inherently mascu
line and feminine roles, that the body as signifier absolutely deter
mined one's signified gender. Even if he had disagreed, of course,
an alternative ending involving homosexuality or another uncon
ventional arrangement would have been censored, that is, it would
have put the plot into Butler's "uninhabitable", "unlivable," "ab
ject" realm (Bodies 3, 243), the domain of the failure of the symbolic
as manifested in alternative sexuality. Characters may cross-dress
and take on new identities, and other characters may accept them
in their new "performances," but always for the purpose of resig
nifying the social norm. At the same time, there is, within the limits
of the play, a consistent notion, born out by the symbolic apotheo
sis of marriage at the end, that the identities they choose for them
selves are theatrical and "performative" in a way that their "real"
identities are not. Masquerade is not a defining experience, but is
only "the performative production of a sexual ontology'' (Butler,
Gender 47), one based on the inculcation of what it means to be
masculine or feminine. At the same time, feminists, bisexuals, ho
mosexuals and others whom John Rechy might call "sexual out
laws" who resist symbolic normalization are nonetheless subject to
that normalization. In fact, they are products of the same norms
that they try to resist or overthrow (Butler, Bodies 15). Every being
is constrained by the "radically unthinkable," of "desiring other
wise" (Butler, Bodies 94) in the case of sexuality. The undeniable
aspect of homosexuality, or at least potential homosexuality, in the
disjunction between anatomy and signifier in the play is firmly re
pudiated without ever being mentioned. One must desire the other
gender (Butler, Bodies 239); homosexuality must be rejected in the
overall scheme of heterosexual regulation. The law attempts to
make homosexuality not just undoable, but unthinkable, unmen
tionable, nefandus. Within the terms of the play and its larger soci
ety, "Celia" cannot hope to consummate her desire for Serafina
with the same success that "Cesar'' can.
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Of course, censorship by no means eliminates a topic from dis
course; the prohibitions in the law can even eroticize and make se
ductive the very activities they try to eliminate (Butler, Bodies 109115, 127, 190). As Althusser noted, "a relation of misrecognition
persists between the law and the subject it compels" (cited in But
ler, Bodies 122). Censorship only shifts the subject underground,
calling attention to its absence in the process. When homosexual
subjects and objects, or even the hint of homosexuality, neverthe
less reappear, they cast in doubt the validity, the certainty, of the
authorized position. Because the symbolic is itself not-all, there is
always an otherness hidden within the subject, an otherness that
creates significant anxiety for the subject intent on asserting itself
as not-other. Most importantly, the "outside" or ''beyond" does
not cease to exist; it lies in wait, threatening the symbolic law and
order.6 It is to be considered as a failure to submit to the proper
symbolic regulation, an imaginary aberration, devoid of the sym
bolic prestige of heterosexuality. At the same time, the appearance
at the margins of alternate symbolic constructs enhances identifi
cation with the norm. The intended humor of the play resides at
least in part in the assumed notion that we can all agree on the
impossibility of the hinted homosexuality. In this manner, hetero
sexual culture produces some drag for itself, as Butler notes: "we
might think of Julie Andrews in Victor, Victoria or Dustin Hoffman
in Tootsie or Jack Lemmon in Some Like It Hot where the anxiety over
a possible homosexual consequence is both produced and de
flected within the narrative trajectory of the films" (Bodies 126).
Heterosexual spectators are reassured that they are normal and ac
ceptable, underscoring the fact that subjects define themselves in
the symbolic in part by reference to what they are not: not dead,
not perverse, not criminal, not alien, not other. By establishing the
limits of acceptable and unacceptable sexuality, heterosexuality
and homosexuality define each other. Homosexuality, by its very
existence outside the symbolic norm circumscribes and delimits
the symbolically acceptable. At the same time, homosexuality, as a
symbolic concept, could not exist without the contrasting, defining
terms of heterosexuality. It is, thus, an "outside" that is fully "in
side," created by the same normative system that tries to prevent
it. According to Butler, it is not "a possibility beyond culture, but
a concrete cultural possibility that is refused and redescribed as
impossible."'
A culture that works ceaselessly to eradicate homosexuality both
produces and subjugates homosexual subjects. At the same time,
it "produces occasional spaces in which those annihilating norms,
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those killing ideals of gender and race, are mimed, reworked, re
signified" (Butler, Bodies 125-26). One such space is the theater,
where playwrights have always played with the notion of easily
changeable identity, including gender designation. Unlike other
fictional genres, theater presents a character on stage who is only
what he or she does, says, or wears. There is no guiding, omnipo
tent narrator to contextualize what one sees. Other characters can
respond in ways that would be wholly unlikely in reality. More
over, repression causes artists to become more creative, more imag
inative, and, in a real sense, more subversive.8 In comedies, the
truth is masked behind a ridiculous facade, one that allows us to
call into question fundamental beliefs about sex, gender, and iden
tity, while giving us an escape by pretending to be absurd. Given
the nature of censorship and repression in the Golden Age, it is just
this kind of intentional misdirection that Calderon, and the come
dia in general, developed so well. The comedia raises the fear of
sexual fluidity, of transgression, of perversion, then calms it, yet
another example of Reichenberger's dictum that the trajectory of
comedia plots is from order disturbed to order restored.
The comedia depended upon a paying public and was, as a re
sult, hugely majoritarian in its overt social and political views. The
anticipated gaze of the comedia audience is clearly heterosexual
and culturally homogeneous. The spectators are meant to be part
of the "us" of the dominant stage society. No doubt, state censor
ship and cultural norms were partly responsible for the legitima
tion of certain characters and delegitimation of others. But that
same attempt at regulation, simultaneously bracketing and cap
tioning taboos, allows for the plays to deal with, or at least hint at,
behaviors considered unspeakable. Las manos blancas is, at least in
part, a play about what can and cannot be spoken or shown on
stage, about the limits of the symbolic sexual imperatives, and
about the ability of art to send multiple, contradictory messages
that will simultaneously uphold and subvert the symbolic culture.
Calderon points to a sexuality that is left vacant; he outlines the
lacking object, in this case, homosexual desire; he calls into ques
tion the defining terms of acceptable and unacceptable sexuality;
he plays with the boundaries between "inside" and "outside,"
highlighting in the process that that which is "outside" both de
fines and is determined by the social "inside" (Butler, Bodies 206).
Unable or unwilling to investigate homosexuality directly, Calde
ron has captioned it indirectly by carefully tracing the lines of het
erosexuality, leaving it up to the audience to realize that what is
left over or left out, what is literally nefandus, is indeed the homo-
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sexuality that he couldn't present on stage, and that gender parody
is not of a "real" gender attributed to a sex, but rather of the notion
that there is such exclusive attribution in the first place (Butler,

Gender 138).
Notes
1. Butler does a thorough, although flawed, examination of Lacan's concept of
the phallus (Butler, Bodies 73-74, 77-88, 197-198, 205; Gender 44-49). The flaw
comes when she overemphasizes a single text ("Signification of the Phallus") and
tries to make concrete concepts that Lacan steadfastly refuses to reify. She appears
to want to recast the phallus only as an imaginary effect (Butler, Bodies 81) and
insist on the connection between the phallus and the penis (83-84). Lacan uses
the phallus in a number of different, even contradictory ways, depending upon
his use of the term in reference to symbolic, imaginary, and real effects on the
subject. I find that Butler's oversimplified use of the term 6, phallus is not particu
larly useful, especially in light of the misreadings given the term by feminist and
Derridean scholarship. It is, rather, much more useful to discuss gender in terms
of social norms and signification, with the understanding that there is a phallic
component to all of this. However, it is not the intention of this article to go into
detail regarding Lacan's writings themselves, or even to docum ent every refer
ence to his works. With rare exception, the Lacanian text can be accessed via But
ler's notes.
2. Here there is some hint that a mother's treatment can feminize a man, thus
unlinking masculinity from maleness. In his first appearance on stage, Cesar sings
of Aquiles:
... presumo que soy yo
quien en mujer transforma
su madre, pues que desea
que entre mujeres criado,
de Marte el furor ignore....

(1087b)

(I presume that I am the one

whose mother transformed him

into a woman, since she desires

that, reared among women,
he shall remain ignorant of Mars's fury].

There is also here a hint of masculine homosexuality as femininity, since a male
who is not masculine must be a woman; the universe is divided into just those
two categories.
3. Butler would separate the kind of fluidity supposedly evinced by these char
acters from the natu.re of gender in real people. There is a great difference be
tween the abject on stage and the abject in real life. A drag queen can be amusing
or sympathetic on stage and frightening and threatening to the same audience on
the bus home. Outside the conventions of the theater, "the act becomes danger
ous, if it does, precisely because there are no theatrical conventions to delimit the
purely imaginary character of the act, indeed, on the street or in the bus, there is
no presumption that the act is distinct from a reality'' ("Performative" 278).
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4. In Bodies That Matter, Butler discusses subjectivity, symbolic signification,
and language (1-9) and the symbolic and imaginary effects of anatomical differ
ence (64-66), basing her notions primarily on Lacan's "Mirror Stage" (Ecrits 1-7)
and "The Signification of the Phallus" (Ecrits 281-91).
5. Butler, Bodies 97. Butler studies at length the Aristotelian dictum that matter
is original potentiality and form is actuality, seen in terms of sex in the Spanish
phrase "Materia la mujer, el hombre forma" (Butler, Bodies 31-36). In her reading
of this dichotomy, matter is not-all without the grammatical, discursive addition
of form, which also carries symbolic signification relating to power and repression
(33-34).
6. Butler, Bodies 231-232, Gender 112. Foucault has pointed out that the attach

ment of gender attributes and a sexual object to a particular anatomical sex is "an
unnatural conjunction of cultural constructs in the service of reproductive inter
ests" (cited by Butler, "Performative" 275).
7. One indication of unwanted otherness lies in the mixture of signifiers. In sex,
the abject subject is one who is not properly gendered, either through deficient or
contradictory genitals, or through a disjunction between the genitals and symbol
markers such as clothing and gesture, or between the genitals and behavior that
does not conform to the symbolic norm, such as bestiality, homosexuality, and
other "sex crimes" (Butler, Bodies 8).
8. Gender 77. Curiously, however, once a concept has been articulated in the
symbolic, it cannot be completely retracted. This is the way the symbolic changes,
and makes of the symbolic not a permanent structure but something more in the
manner of a "temporalized regulation of signification" (Butler, Bodies 22). That
which was taboo or, even worse, unspeakable (nefandus), can become a topic of
normal conversation. For example, homosexuality, which was for centures the
"sin that dare not speak its name," has in our own day turned into what Armis
tead Maupin has characterized as the sin that won't shut up. The acceptance of
homosexuality in American culture is far from complete, but just the last thirty
years have witnessed the birth and rise of a truly astonishing public discourse
regarding the most intimate details of homosexuals, homosexuality, and homo
sexual behavior, due almost entirely to the willingness of homosexuals to speak
out and be publicly recognized for their sexual orientation.
9. When the Hays Office began to centralize censorship of Hollywood movies
in 1922, the result was the creation of an new genre, the screwball comedy, in
which sex was present, but only as a subtext underlying the clever dialog and
coded plot lines. Through their efforts to protect the public from immorality, the
censors forced the creation of some of the wittiest and most subversive comedies
written for the screen.
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